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Abstract: Funding gaps occur when for a particular group of enterprises there are not 
enough available funds to finance their growth. Such enterprises are typical ly young, 
innovative and technology-oriented startup companies. These companies do not have 
significant revenues or collaterals; hence they are not suitable for bank financing. On the 
other hand the information problems decrease their chances to attract investors and also 
there is high uncertainty involved in these companies. The method of venture capital 
financing was established to operate in this financing gap and to provide funds for these 
technology-oriented, young startup enterprises. There is an extensive literature that 
highlights that venture capitalists are capable and willing to provide financing for these 
enterprises as a result of their special expertise and business experience and their 
sophisticated value creation methods. In this article the authors introduce a real options 
reasoning in order to give an interpretation of venture capital decision-making method and 
why venture capital is willing to operate in funding gaps and how it is able to bridge them. 
With the involvement in the operation of the invested companies venture capitalists create 
options that increase the value of the firm. Also in option-valuation the higher the 
uncertainty of the asset is, the higher the value of the option is. That is the reason, why 
other passive funding forms reject the financing of startup enterprises, while venture capital 
is willing to provide funds for them. In this article we will describe the problem of funding 
gaps, than we will introduce real options and their effect on investment decision. In the last 
part of the article we will demonstrate how real options appear and are created in venture 
capital financing as a result of its special characteristics and how the real options approach 
can explain the ability of venture capitalist of bridging funding gaps. 
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1. Funding gaps and venture capital 
We can define funding gaps as the hiatus of the supply and demand of financial sources 
(Nagy, 2004). Funding gaps occur usually in cases of companies in a given point of their 
life and with special field of activity. The problem of funding gap is prevalent in young, 
technology-oriented startup enterprises. As a result of the funding gaps, companies with 
huge growth potential are not able to obtain the necessary capital for their operation; 
hence they cannot live up to their growth potential. 
Funding gaps evolve in case of startup companies as a result of their special 
characteristics. In the seed and early stages of their lives these companies are in the 
phase of product development or they have just made their market entry. They are in the 
lack of collaterals or significant revenues; hence they are unable to obtain bank financing. 
The capital structure of these enterprises affects their competitiveness and the dominance 
of loans in their capital structure would result in a heavy burden on their cash flows 
(Herczeg, 2009). On the other hand the 3F funds (family, friends and fools) are not 
sufficient to finance the further growth of these enterprises. 
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Also these companies have high risk and uncertainty. Becsky-Nagy and Fazekas (2015) 
discusses the special risks and the sources of uncertainty that plays an important role in 
case of young, innovative companies. There is a high business risk involved in startup 
companies. Cochrane (2005) showed, that in case of venture capital investments that aims 
innovative, young companies, the returns are strongly positively skewed that suggests that 
most of the companies generate low and even negative returns but few enterprises are 
able to reach extremely high returns. Cochrane (2005) also showed that the risk of these 
enterprises is company-specific idiosyncratic risk and not systematic risk. 
The high uncertainty also derives from imperfect information. As these companies do not 
have a track record and their activity is specific it is difficult to evaluate them, hence 
adverse selection described by Akerlof (1970) occurs. Furthermore, as these enterprises 
need external financing the principal-agent problem described by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) also occurs and the uncertainty derives from this relationship contributes to the 
funding gaps as well. 
 
  
Figure 1: The available equity-funding for young enterprises in their different stages of 
growth 
Source: Szerb (2006) 
 
As we can see on Figure 1, venture capital is the main external funding source of 
enterprises. Venture capital appears in the early stages of the life of companies when they 
are generating losses and the faith and viability of the company is doubtful. In the so called 
death-valley, before the market entry the uncertainty of these enterprises is high, but 
provided that adequate capital and knowledge is available for these enterprises they can 
achieve high growth rate and reach the point where an IPO is feasible. 
 
 
2. Basics of real options reasoning 
The role of uncertainty plays a crucial role in option valuation. In the traditional investment 
analyses methods the higher the uncertainty is the lower the value of the investment is. On 
the other hand in options valuation the higher the volatility of the underlying asset is the 
higher the value of the option is. The reason of this relationship of volatility and options is, 
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that in case of options the losses are limited (we do not exercise the option, when it is out 
of the money so we only lose the price of the option), while in case of favourable changes 
in the price of the underlying asset we can gain profit (in case of put option, the maximum 
of our profit is the strike price, while in case of call options the profit  is unlimited in theory). 
Volatility increases the value of options because the downside risk and the probability of 
loss are eliminated while the chance of high profit increases. 
The role of uncertainty appears similarly in case of real options. In an uncertain business 
environment the management of the company has the ability to react to the changes of the 
environment and the occurring problems and possibilities. The traditional DCF (Discounted 
Cash Flow) based investment analyses methods are not able to incorporate the value of 
managerial flexibility into the evaluation, although in strategic investments this flexibility of 
the management can increase the value. Rózsa (2004) based on the literature describes 
the following options that managers may have in the implementation of an investment: 
§ deferment 
§ rejection 
§ expansion 
§ staging 
§ switch 
§ alteration 
§ learning 
Real options integrate the traditional DCF based evaluation methods with option valuation 
and provide a strategic approach of investment analyses where the value of the 
management flexibility appears. Figure 2 shows how real options change the DCF based 
NPV’s (Net Present Value) distribution. 
As we can see on Figure 2, the presence of options changes the distribution of NPV in two 
ways. First of all, the expected value of the investment increases as a result of the added 
value of the options. On the other hand the distribution will be positively skewed. The 
reason of the changed skewness is that options can mitigate losses and enhance the 
positive outcomes. The design of the option allows its holder to benefit from uncertainty in 
the occurrence of favourable events (McGrath, 1997). 
 
 
Figure 2: The effect of real options on the distribution of investment’s NPV 
Source: Yeo, K. T. and Qiu, F. (2003) 
 
 
3. The role of real options reasoning in venture capital financing 
Compared to other funding forms venture capital is willing and more successful in 
managing risks and uncertainty. The literature explains this feature of venture capital with 
the special expertise and business experience of the venture capital investors that enables 
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them to increase the value of the firm in order to realize profit via exiting the invested 
companies (Becskyné Nagy, 2006). As they provide equity type financing, the investors 
become owners of the invested companies and as owners their priority is to maximize their 
wealth via increasing the firm’s value (Rózsa and Tálas, 2012). As a result of their 
expertise they can select the invested companies more efficiently and they can also 
provide non-financial value added services after the investment in order to increase the 
value of the invested companies (Chemmanur et al., 2011). 
The real options approach of venture capital investments also relies on the special 
expertise of venture capital investors. Real options can be viewed as a decision-making 
method and valuation technique, a logic for strategic planning (Driouchi and Bennett, 
2012). The reason why real options can be applied in venture capital investments is that 
the investors provide managerial assistance as well; hence they can influence the 
operation of the invested companies (Nagy, 2002; Becsky-Nagy, 2014). This feature of 
venture capital creates real options in the investments. As Copeland and Keenan (1998) 
shows, the uncertainty and the future opportunities of investments alone does not create 
real options. They emphasize the role of the management’s capabilities to recognize the 
options. It is also crucial how effectively the management can respond to the changes of 
the uncertain environment. Miller (2002) also highlights the competence of the 
management as a determinant of the value of the options. Rangan (1998) describes that 
the value of options can be realized only if there is adequate knowledge, tools and 
resources. 
Venture capital investors have the necessary expertise and knowledge to realize options. 
Venture capitalists establish their managerial networks in order to match enterprises with 
the suitable managers who have the necessary skills and business experience (Carvalho 
et al., 2005). The literature emphasizes the role of the invested company’s management 
and according to many studies the management team of companies are more important in 
the investment decisions than the idea or the activity of the enterprises itself (Kaplan et al., 
2009). These features of venture capital are consistent with real options reasoning as the 
knowledge provided by the investors and what makes it possible to utilize the options in 
the companies. 
Venture capitalists use special methods and tools that allow them to create and take 
advantage of the options of investments (Becsky-Nagy and Fazekas, 2015). The practice 
of multi-staged financing is generally used by venture capitalists hence the option of 
staging occurs in these investments. Staging plays an important role in the risk 
management of venture capital. The first financing round can be viewed as a test period, 
where the investors can gather more information about the invested companies without 
committing the full amount of capital that is needed to the investment. Staging can mitigate 
losses in case of unviable companies while keeping alive the potentially successful ones. 
Convertible securities are also widespread in venture capital financing as they can 
decrease downside risk of investments as they can function as debt-like financing if the 
value of equity is lower than the face value of the securities while in case of high equity 
value the securities can be converted hence the investors have the benefits of the 
increased value of the firm’s equity (Hellmann, 2006). 
Monitoring and participation in the operation of the company is also important in the real 
options approach. The information provided by the operation is crucial in the management 
of the companies (Fenyves et al., 2014), because the uncertainty connected to the 
invested companies is endogen to the enterprises and generated by the investment 
process itself (Rózsa, 2007). Monitoring is essential in order to be able to gather this 
information and react to the possibilities of the companies. 
It is also important on the long run that each investment provide information for the 
investors so they become more experienced. The role of this information has high 
importance especially in a rapidly changing technical environment (Orbán Mrs. Tamás 
Dékán, 2013). Investors can harness this knowledge in their future investments and they 
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can increase their efficiency. That is the reason why learning options, described by Yeo 
and Qiu (2003) occur as well, because the knowledge gained by the investment process 
has value. 
As it is discussed above, real options occur and are created in venture capital investments. 
If we apply real options reasoning to venture capital financing we can see why venture 
capital is willing to finance companies that other funding forms are not, and why venture 
capital can bridge the funding gaps. First of all, the options value increases the expected 
value of the investments; hence investments rejected by traditional DCF-based analyses 
methods will be accepted if we incorporate the value of options into the valuation method. 
The role of uncertainty in real options approach plays an even more important role. In 
options valuation volatility increases the value of options as the downside risk can be 
eliminated while the upside part of the volatility creates the chance of high returns. In the 
companies that are in the focus of venture capital financing there is a high uncertainty and 
that is the reason why most funding forms are averse to provide them capital. On the other 
hand, as venture capitalists are able to create and recognize options and they can realize 
the benefits of the high uncertainty while minimizing its negative consequences. 
 
 
4. In conclusion 
The young, innovative technology-oriented startup enterprises that bring novelty to the 
market often cannot obtain capital in order to finance their growth, hence funding gaps 
occur. As a result of the high degree of asymmetric information and uncertainty in these 
companies the more risk averse funding sources are not willing to provide capital for them, 
on the other hand venture capital has a unique approach towards risk that can be 
described via real options reasoning. 
Via the involvement in the operation of the enterprises, special expertise and risk 
management techniques venture capitalist can create and utilize options in the 
investments. Real options reasoning gives an explanation of venture capital’s investment 
activity and why this funding form is willing and able to bear and manage higher risks more 
efficiently than other funding sources. In options reasoning the higher volatility of 
investments become a favourable feature and that is the reason why venture capital 
provides primarily funding for startup enterprises and why venture capital can bridge 
funding gaps. 
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